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Of Foreign Fevers, Shot, and Shell:
Constitutional Rights of Media Access to the
Battlefield after Flynt v. Rumsfeld
Thomas C. Terry, Ph.D.*
And paramount among the responsibilities of a free press is the
duty to prevent any part of the government from deceiving the
people and sending them off to distant lands to die of foreign
fevers and foreign shot and shell.
 Associate Justice Hugo Black1
ABSTRACT
Cresting the dune, the camouflaged Humvee crashed through the
bracken-covered sandy top and plunged down the opposite side
in a spray of sand and small stones and to the groan of
suspension and the rattle of jerry cans. The sound of explosions
echoed in the distance. The reporter in the suicide seat
gripped the sweat-slickened handhold tighter against the
careening of the vehicle. Her head joggled, and she snugged her
satphone as the Humvee clawed for traction. The reporter
undoubtedly felt she had a constitutional right to be there,
slashing towards Baghdad. If called upon to justify her presence,
she would have argued so. But did she? American media and
military have sparred for decades over access to the battlefield
since the Pentagon, feeling burned by the unrestricted access of
the Vietnam War, experimented with pools and embedding.
While reporters and news organizations frequently bridled at the
restrictions, they sought no legal recourse until Hustler
* Professor, Department of Journalism and Communication, Utah State University.
1 N.Y. Times, Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971).
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publisher Larry Flynt filed suit against the Department of
Defense several times, eventually claiming a constitutional right
of access to the scenes of American combat operations. This
study examines the relevant case law and historical
circumstances leading up to the Supreme Courts denial of
certiorari of Flynt v. Rumsfeld in October 2004 and suggests
whether any constitutional rights of access arguments remain.2
To every army and almost every general a newspaper reporter
goes along . . . inciting jealousy and discontent, and doing
infinite mischief.
 General William Tecumseh Sherman3
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12, 2004) (Rumsfeld III). Since Larry Flynt is a principal in two cases before five
courts discussed in this study, to avoid confusion they will be referred to by the other
partys name with a Roman numeral to differentiate them: Flynt v. Rumsfeld, 180 F.
Supp. 2d 174 (D.D.C. 2002) (Rumsfeld I); Flynt v. Rumsfeld, 355 F.3d 697 (D.C. Cir.
2004) (Rumsfeld II); Flynt v. Rumsfeld, 355 F.3d 697 (D.C. Cir. 2004), cert. denied,
543 U.S. 925 (Oct. 12, 2004) (Rumsfeld III); Flynt v. Weinberger, 588 F. Supp.2d 57
(D.D.C. 1984) (Weinberger I) vacated, 762 F.2d 134 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Weinberger
II).
3 PHILLIP KNIGHTLEY, THE FIRST CASUALTY: THEWAR CORRESPONDENT AS HERO AND
PROPAGANDIST FROM THE CRIMEA TO KOSOVO 28 (Prion Books Ltd., 2d ed. 2000).
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I. INTRODUCTION
After September 11, 2001 and with the prospect of warfare looming,
Hustler publisher Larry Flynt struck preemptively against the
Department of Defense. He first filed suit in the District of Columbia
federal court in November 2001, claiming historic media access to the
battlefield.4 He further contended the battlefield was a public fora and
demanded that a Hustler reporter be embedded with troops in
Afghanistan.5 He also charged that Directive 5122.5 (Enclosure 3), the
Department of Defense document governing media access to combat
operations, was an unconstitutional form of licensing.6 The federal
District Court for the District of Columbia denied Flynts motion for a
preliminary injunction, claiming he had not presented sufficient rationale
to justify injunctive relief, according to Judge Paul Friedman, writing the
opinion of the court.7
Flynt would not be dissuaded. He filed an amended complaint with
the District Court, adding a claim of a constitutional right of access. The
District Court again rebuffed Flynt. Flynt appealed to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, which in 2004 affirmed the lower courts
ruling.8 Judge David Sentelle, writing the unanimous opinion,
unequivocally rejected Flynts constitutional demand to have a Hustler
reporter embedded. [W]e hold that there is no constitutionally based
right for the media to embed with U.S. military forces in combat . . . ,
Judge Sentelle stated.9 Flynt subsequently appealed to the Supreme
Court, which denied certiorari on October 12, 2004 in a terse one-line
release, along with dozens of others.10 Judge Sentelle had been hostile to
press access rights before, writing the unanimous decision in Center for
National Security Studies v. Department of Justice.11 That 2003 D.C.
Circuit decision approved the constitutionality of the federal Freedom of
4 Rumsfeld I, 180 F. Supp. 2d 174.
5 Id.
6 Id.; Rudy DeLeon, Dep. Secy. of Def., U.S. Dept. of Def. Directive 5122.5
(Enclosure 3), Sept. 27, 2000.
7 Rumsfeld I, F. Supp. 2d at 176.
8 Rumsfeld II, 355 F.3d at 706.
9 Id.
10 Rumsfeld III, 255 F.3d 697.
11 See 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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Information Act exemption that allowed withholding the names of
suspects detained after September 11, 2001.
Though military operations have ceased in Iraq and are dramatically
winding down in Afghanistan, American soldiers are still engaged in
military operations in those countries. Additionally, several hundred
advisers have been deployed back into Iraq to face the ISIS threat. Al
Qaeda may be weakened after multiple assassinations of top leaders, but
it is still potent. Concerns over nuclear proliferation in Iran and North
Korea remain. A pugnacious Russia is flexing its geopolitical muscles in
Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Syria is disintegrating, while Bahrain
and Saudi Arabia may well be tinderboxes. ISIS is posing an increasing
and perplexing challenge as well. The world remains a dangerous,
dubious, and complicated arena, and the opportunity for further
American military action is very real; in fact, inevitable. And taking
Justice Black at his word in the opening quotation of this study, the need
for independent observation of military operations by the media is as
vital as ever. But over the past two decades, media access to United
States combat forces has been erratic as the Pentagon toggled between
delayed media access in Grenada, pool access in the first Gulf War, and
embedding in the Iraq War. Will embedding, praised by many
journalists, continue? If battlefield reverses occur or further behavior
such as Abu Ghraib recurs, will access be suddenly withdrawn by an
embarrassed, chastened, furious, or secretive government and military?
American citizens, buffeted by revelations over widespread NSA email
and cell phone intercepts, insurgency in post-war Iraq, and alleged
torture at Guantanamo, turn to the media for explanation. These
troublesome scenarios at first blush argue for an unambiguous Supreme
Court decision resolving whether there is a constitutional right of the
media to report from the sites of American combat.
II. A TRIO OF CASES
General William Tecumseh Sherman observed, Its impossible to
carry on a war with a free press.12 Though it may be obvious what he
meant by that comment, paradoxically, it can also be read two different
waysone involving a military battlefield and the other a political and
constitutional battlefield. If Sherman were at the Pentagon today, he
would have to coexist with the modern media.
There is a trio of crucial cases at various federal court levels that has
sought establishment of a constitutional right of access to the battlefield:
12 Peter Andrews, The Media and the Military, AMERICAN HERITAGE, July-Aug.1991,
at 80.
2014-15] OF FOREIGN FEVERS, SHOT, AND SHELL 99
Flynt v. Weinberger at the District and Appellate Court levels,13 Flynt v.
Rumsfeld at the District, Appellate,14 and Supreme Court levels, and
Nation Magazine v. United States Department of Defense.15
Flynt v. Weinberger (Weinberger I) was filed by Hustler magazine
publisher Larry Flynt during the United States invasion of Grenada in
1983, but dismissed the next year in a per curiam opinion by the Federal
District Court for the District of Columbia.16 The federal district court in
Weinberger I decided wars, such as the invasion of Grenada, were short
in duration and unlikely to be repeated, despite substantial historical
evidence to the contrary over the preceding half century.17 Flynt
appealed to the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, which held the
issue was moot because combat had ceased.18
Frustrated by their treatment during the 1983 Grenada campaign
when they were kept offshore for two days, journalists lobbied for more
access.19 In response, the Reagan administration set up a commission and
adopted its recommendation to create press pools.20 When the military
had the chance to implement the pool system during the invasion of
Panama in 1989, it was not activated until after the invasion had been
underway for 24 hours.21 And when pool reporters did arrive in Panama,
they were sequestered on a base, rather than given access to events as
they unfolded.22
Pool coverage was continued during the first Gulf War in 1991.
Nation magazine, along with several others, notably Harpers magazine
and the Village Voice, were excluded from this pool system and brought
suit during the military build-up phase of the first Gulf War but before
the actual attack against Iraq began.23 By the time the case was decided,
the war was over, and it was dismissed because the legal issue was moot,
regulations had been lifted, and a well-focused controversy was absent,
according to the federal court for the Southern District of New York.24
13 SeeWeinberger I, 588 F.Supp. 57 (D.D.C 1984) vacated byWeinberger II, 762 F.2d
134 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
14 See Rumsfeld I, 180 F. Supp. 2d 174 (D.D.C. 2002); see also Rumsfeld II, 355 F.3d
697; Rumsfeld III, 355 F.3d 697, cert denied, 543 U.S. 925.
15 See 762 F.Supp. 1558 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
16 Weinberger I, 588 F. Supp. 57.
17 Id. at 59.
18 Weinberger II, 762 F.2d 134, 136 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
19 Kevin A. Smith, The Media at the Point of the Spear, 102MICH. L. REV. 1329, 1334
(2004).
20 Id. at 1334
21 Id. at 1336.
22 Id.
23 Nation, 762 F.Supp. at 1561.
24 Id. at 1575.
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However, most importantly, the federal district court in Nation
pronounced that battlefields were a limited public fora and as such the
media were entitled to a conditional right of access.25
In preparation for war in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Pentagon adopted
still another method for media coverage of U.S. military operations,
abandoning press pools in favor of embedding as recommended by yet
another advisory commission. Flynt initially asked to have a Hustler
reporter accompany Special Forces in Afghanistan, but his request was
rejected. While repulsing Flynt, Assistant Secretary of Defense Victoria
Clarke restated the militarys adherence to Department of Defense
Directive 5122.5 (Enclosure 3) mandating [o]pen and independent
reporting [as] the principal means of coverage of U.S. military
operations.26 Despite that commitment, Clarke equivocated, noting
pools might be a temporary expedient and that access to Special Forces
operations could be restricted.27 Rather than waiting to see whether a
Hustler reporter would be embedded, Flynt filed suit in late 2001.
Rumsfeld III worked its way unsuccessfully from the federal district
court for the District of Columbia to the Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit, and then to the Supreme Court, which denied certiorari.28
III. WHAT REMAINS
A. Courtroom Analogy
Flynt argued that access to the courtroom in Richmond Newspapers
established the precedent that provided the media first with a historic and
then a constitutional right to attend the battlefield to observe and report.29
The possibility exists that the Supreme Court could find a pattern of
historic access to the battlefield based on the precedent of First
Amendment cases supporting the assertion of these rights. Non-
combatants have been present at battlefields by accident, certainly, but
also by choice on numerous occasions, often taking picnic lunches and
making a battle into an outing, such as at Culloden in 1746 and First Bull
Run in 1861. French cab drivers rushed troops to the front to blunt the
German onslaught against Paris in 1914. Civilians ferried British,
25 Id. at 1574 (citing Heffron v. Intl. Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640,
648 (1981)).
26 Appellants Brief, supra note 4, at 4.
27 Rumsfeld I, 180 F. Supp. 2d 174 (D.D.C. 2002) .
28 Rumsfeld III, 355 F.3d 697 (D.C. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 925 (Oct. 12,
2004).
29 Rumsfeld II, 355 F.3d at 703-04 (citing Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S.
555, 556 (1980)).
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French, and Belgian troops across the English Channel from Dunkirk in
1940.
In Rumsfeld II, Flynt further argued the value of the media in the
proper functioning of American democracy, citing another Supreme
Court case, Mills v. Alabama.30 Justice Hugo Black, in the majority
opinion in Mills, wrote that the press serves and was designed to serve
as a powerful antidote to any abuses of power by governmental
officials . . . .31 Justice Black added that suppression of the right of the
press to praise or criticize governmental agents and to clamor and
contend for or against change . . . muzzles one of the very agencies the
Framers of our Constitution thoughtfully and deliberately selected to
improve our society and keep it free.32 Moreover, writing in the
Pentagon Papers case, Justice Black believed the essential purpose and
history of the First Amendment argued for an unfettered media.33 The
Governments power to censor the press was abolished so the press
would remain forever free to censure the Government, Justice Black
continued.34 The press was protected so it could bare the secrets of
government and inform the people.35 Presumably, some means to
acquire information is constitutionally implicit through the language of
the First Amendment. Relying entirely on information coming in over
the transom, as in the Pentagon Papers case, would seem to enfeeble
rather than empower First Amendment liberties. Furthermore, only a
free and unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in
government, Justice Black stressed.36
Four votes are necessary to grant certiorari, so at best at least six
Justices did not see the constitutional point when they denied certiorari in
Rumsfeld III. The core contention in all the battlefield access cases has
been that the press has a First Amendment right to report independently
at the scene of American combat operations. I have no doubt that this
question raises a potentially important issue of constitutional law, Judge
Harry T. Edwards of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit wrote in
Weinberger II.37 However, the Court of Appeals was able to
disingenuously, albeit cleverly, skirt  and ignore  the matter because
the issue of constitutional battlefield access was mentioned during oral
30 Rumsfeld III, 355 F.3d 697, 703 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
31 Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966).
32 Id.
33 N.Y. Times, Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971).
34 Id.
35 Id. (emphasis added).
36 Id.
37 Weinberger II, 762 F.2d 134, 136 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Edwards, H., concurring).
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arguments but not encompassed within the complaint before the district
court.38
Federal District Judge Leonard Sand in Nation considered a media
right of access to the battlefield as a legal novelty, but one that did
implicate the First Amendment.39 [T]here is support for the proposition
that the press has at least some minimal right of access to view and report
about major events that affect the function of government, including, for
example, an overt combat operation, Judge Sand wrote.40 Nevertheless,
he shied away from the underlying constitutional issue. In order to
decide this case on the merits, it would be necessary to define the outer
constitutional boundaries of access, Judge Sand continued. It was
something courts should refrain from [doing when faced with] issues
presented in a highly abstract form, bumping the burden to a higher
power, especially in instances where the Supreme Court has not
articulated guiding standards, he added, kicking the decision upstairs to
the high court.41 Judge Sentelle had no such qualms, writing the
unanimous opinion of the Court of Appeals in Rumsfeld II. There is
nothing we have found in the Constitution, American history, or case law
that requires the military to provide the media with access to combat, he
concluded unequivocally.42
B. Special Privileges
Rights often percolate in the imaginations of political philosophers
and legal scholars while gaining wider traction in academic and legal
journals, before arising in the footnotes, dissents, and concurrences of
court decisions. The right to privacy began with Milton, and then Warren
and Brandeis, before entering the legal arena.43 New rights emerge from
the dim penumbras of the Constitution into the white-heat glare of
Supreme Court precedent. And, actually, the Supreme Court has already
extended special privileges to the press in the past, though most are
couched within the speech clause. It provided access to the courtroom in
Richmond Newspapers for the press as well as the public and accorded
protection against harassment by the government in Branzburg.44 In
38 Id.
39 Nation Magazine v. U.S. Dept of Def., 762 F.Supp. 1558 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
40 Id. at 1572.
41 Id.
42 Rumsfeld III, 355 F.3d 697, 703 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
43 Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890) and John Milton, Areopagitica: A Speech of Mr John Milton for the Liberty of
Unlicencd Printing, to the Parliament of England, 1644.
44 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665 (1972).
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Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue,
the Court prevented the use of taxation as a weapon, and in New York
Times v. Sullivan, it extended substantial libel protections.45 The Court
struck down a Florida law requiring a right of reply by newspapers to
political candidates inMiami Herald v. Tornillo.46
In the Pentagon Papers case, the Court reiterated its stance against
prior restraint with concurring and dissenting opinions supporting the
extension of press access rights.47 Somewhat at odds with his overall
opinion in Richmond Newspapers, Chief Justice Warren Burger admitted
journalists often enjoyed special seating and priority of entry [in
courtrooms] so that they may report what people in attendance have seen
and heard.48 This seems to suggest at least some separate, albeit
amorphous, press access right. Furthermore, Justice Black in his
concurrence in the Pentagon Papers case tied the free press to coverage
of warfare. And paramount among the responsibilities of a free press is
the duty to prevent any part of the government from deceiving the people
and sending them off to distant lands to die of foreign fevers and foreign
shot and shell.49 Justice Black argued [national] security is a broad,
vague generality whose contours should not be invoked to abrogate the
fundamental law embodied in the First Amendment.50 He went even
further, adding, [t]he guarding of military and diplomatic secrets at the
expense of informed representative government provides no real security
for our Republic.51
C. Rights of Access
In Zemel v. Rusk, the Court supported the State Departments refusal
to issue a passport to a journalist wishing to travel to Cuba.52 Writing for
the Court, Chief Justice Earl Warren stated, the right to speak and
publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather
information.53 This could be read to imply there is at least some
restrained or limited media right of newsgathering, though the extent and
location of that right are unclear, but lurking in the constitutional
shadows. The majority opinion in Branzburg held the press has no rights
45 Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Commr. of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575
(1983); N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
46 Miami Herald Publg Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
47 N.Y. Times, Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971).
48 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 573.
49 N.Y. Times, Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J., concurring). .
50 Id. at 719 (Black, J., concurring).
51 Id.
52 Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 1 (1965).
53 Id. at 17. (emphasis added).
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separate from those enjoyed by members of the public. However, Justice
Stewart in his dissent offered a different point of view and suggested,
[t]he free flow of information to the public protected by the free-press
guarantee would be severely curtailed if no protection whatever were
afforded to the process by which news is assembled and disseminated.54
Justice Stewarts dissenting opinion stressed access to information is
essential for citizens to make decisions regarding their governance.
Enlightened choice by an informed citizenry is the basic ideal upon
which an open society is premised and a free press is thus indispensable
to a free society . . . .[I]t also is an incontestable precondition of self-
government.55 In Sheppard v. Maxwell, the Court observed that [t]he
press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against
the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and
judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.56 That
same scrutiny, arguably could be constitutionally and perhaps politically
extended to other fora, including the battlefield.
D. Press Clause
Another argument centers on the existence of a separate press
battlefield access right rooted in the Press Clause. The central argument
in Rumsfeld III is not about the media satisfying its own curiosity but
instead lies in the notion that the medias secure access to the battlefield
is necessary for the proper operation of the American democratic
system.57 Some Supreme Court justices set great store in this role. Justice
William Brennans concurrence in Richmond Newspapers may be a
stepping off point for a Press Clause battlefield access argument. [T]he
First Amendment embodies more than a commitment to free expression
and communicative interchange for their own sakes; it has a structural
role to play in securing and fostering our republican system of self-
government.58 Justice Byron White added in the same case, the First
Amendment protects the public and the press from abridgment of their
rights of access to information about the operation of their
government.59 Justice White thought it either necessary or important to
add and the press, suggesting he believed the public and the press were
not identical constitutionally.
54 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 727 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting)..
55 Id. at 726-27 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
56 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966).
57 See generally: Flynt v. Rumsfeld, 355 F.3d 697 (D.C. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543
U.S. 925 (Oct. 12, 2004) (Rumsfeld III).
58 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
59 Id. at 584 (White, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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Justice Stewart explained in Or of the Press that all Americans are
guaranteed free expression, but to him this was only part of the Framers
intention:60 If the Free Press guarantee meant no more than freedom of
expression, it would be a constitutional redundancy.61 [T]he Founders
quite clearly recognized the distinction between the two . . . [, and
therefore,] deliberately created an internally competitive system.62
Justice Stewart cited Justice Louis Brandeis dissenting opinion from
Myers v. United States that stated the Founders designed the American
system to take advantage of the inevitable friction incident to the
distribution of the governmental powers . . . to save the people from
autocracy.63 Does that same friction exist between the Speech and Press
clauses? By including both guarantees in the First Amendment, Justice
Stewart added, the Founders quite clearly recognized the distinction
between the two.64
Justice Stewart stated, [t]he primary purpose of the constitutional
guarantee of the free press was . . . to create a fourth institution outside
the Government as an additional check on the three branches.65 In fact,
Justice Stewart explained that in the 12-year run-up to the drafting of the
First Amendment, many state constitutions protected freedom of the
press while at the same time recognizing no general freedom of
speech.66 According to Justice Stewart, the First Amendment Press
Clause mandates a checking function on government by the press and
defines a structural value for the press in the proper operation of the
American constitutional system.67 In his view, its role is to be a
watchdog on government activities and to inform citizens so they can
make educated decisions for their own governance.68 And what is the
most formidable, obvious, and lethal activity Americas government
engages in? Battle. In Branzburg, Justice Stewart noted, [w]e have often
described the process of informing the public as the core purpose of the
constitutional guarantee of free speech and a free press.69 What needs
60 Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 634, 636 (1975). This article
was excerpted from a speech Justice Stewart gave on Nov. 2, 1974 at the sesquicentennial
convocation of Yale Law School, New Haven, CT.
61 Id. at 633.
62 Id. at 634.
63 Id. (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 85 (1926) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
64 Stewart, supra note 55,. at 634.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 633-34.
67 See id. at 631.
68 Id. at 633.
69 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 726 n.1 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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more explaining than the brutal and deadly application of American
foreign policy on the battlefield?
E. Surrogate Role
In Saxbe, Justice Lewis Powell claimed the media in seeking out the
news acts as an agent of the public at large when it gathers news and
that this, then, accords press representatives at least some level of
increased access.70 This press as a surrogate (or proxy) argument may
well buttress a constitutional battlefield access decision. Justice Black
was convinced the essential purpose and history of the First
Amendment argued for an untrammeled press.71 The Governments
power to censor the press was abolished so that the press would remain
forever free to censure the Government, Justice Black continued.72
Furthermore, only a free and unrestrained press can effectively expose
deception in government.73 Justice Powell elaborated, adding, [b]y
enabling the public to assert meaningful control over the political
process, the press performs a crucial function in effecting the societal
purpose of the First Amendment.74
Justice Stewart, concurring in Houchins v. KQED, felt the media
have access rights as a stand-in on behalf of the general public.75 Justice
Stewart opined that terms of access that are reasonably imposed on
individual members of the public may, if they impede effective reporting
without sufficient justification, be unreasonable as applied to journalists
who are there to convey to the general public what the visitors see.76
Chief Justice Burger agreed journalists acted as surrogates for the
public.77 According to Justice Brennans majority opinion in Time, Inc.
v. Hill, freedom of the press is not for the benefit of the press so much
as for the benefit of all of us.78 He indicated that reporters attend the
scenes of disasters and wars, not to satisfy their own curiosity, but on
behalf of their audiences and the public.
F. Licensing
Licensing the press is another argument that remains in the wake of
the Supreme Courts denial of certiorari. In his complaint brought in the
70 Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 863 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting).
71 N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 715 (1971) (Black, J., concurring).
72 Id. at 717.
73 Id.
74 Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 863.
75 Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1, 16 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring).
76 Id. at 17.
77 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1980).
78 Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967).
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D.C. District Court, Flynt asserted that Enclosure 3 qualified as an
unconstitutional licensing requirement because it required permission
from the Department of Defense for exercise of First Amendment
freedom of the press rights.79 In City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer
Publishing Co., the Supreme Court held that when a licensing statute
allegedly vests unbridled discretion in a government official over
whether to permit or deny expressive activity it can be challenged
without the necessity of first applying for, and being denied a license.80
Judge Friedman refused the governments attempt to dismiss that portion
of the complaint, considering it not an uncontroversial extension of
previous Supreme Courts holdings.81 Conspicuously, he ignored it in
his final ruling. Judge Sentelle also rejected the licensing argument.82
In his concurrence in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, Chief
Justice Burger saw licensing as an important constitutional question.83
The very task of including some entities within the institutional press
while excluding others, whether undertaken by legislature, court, or
administrative agency, is reminiscent of the abhorred licensing system of
Tudor and Stuart Englanda system the First Amendment was intended
to ban from this country.84 In the majority decision in Lakewood, Justice
Powell singled out two major First Amendment risks that might accrue
if courts waited until there were concrete and identifiable harms
generated by a denial of expressive rights. The first was self-censorship
by speakers in order to avoid being denied a license to speak and the
second was the difficulty of effectively detecting, reviewing, and
correcting content-based censorship without some sort of identifiable
standards.85
G. Historic Openness
Another important question involves the historic openness argument
on which Flynt pinned so much hope. This argument for Flynt rests on
Richmond Newspapers, the 1980 Supreme Court decision establishing
media access to the courtroom.86 The pivot points are unbroken and
uncontradicted access stretching back centuries, perhaps 1,000 years,
79 Rumsfeld I, 180 F. Supp. 2d 174 (D.D.C. 2002)
80 City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ. Co., 486 U.S. 750, 755-56 (1988).
81 Flynt v. LFP, Inc., 245 F. Supp. 2d 94, 108 (D.D.C. 2003) affd on other grounds
sub nom. Flynt v. Rumsfeld, 355 F.3d 697 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
82 Rumsfeld II, 355 F.3d 697, 703 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
83 First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 800-02 (1978) (Burger, J.,
concurring).
84 Id. at 801.
85 Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 759.
86 Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 556 (1980).
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the standard the Court established in Richmond Newspapers for public
attendance in courtrooms.87 Not unexpectedly, the Court of Appeals and
Flynt analyzed Richmond Newspapers differently. The Court of Appeals
in Rumsfeld II thought it important this tradition was alive during the late
18th Century when Americas organic laws were adopted.88 Flynt urged
the court to extend this right to the battlefield.89 Judge Sentelle countered
that press access to military units is not remotely as extensive as public
access to criminal trials.90 Furthermore, he considered that the Supreme
Court ruling in Houchins v. KQED plainly established that the First
Amendment does not mandate[] a right of access to government
information or sources of information within the governments control,
in this case access to a county jail where an inmate had reportedly
committed suicide.91 Only to the courtroom, given its long, historic
tradition of openness in the United States and England, is the press given
access and that access is no greater than access enjoyed by the general
public, Judge Sentelle pointed out.92 This sort of limitation on the press
seems absurd, considering how governmental powers have massively
expanded access in so many other spheres. Had Judge Sentelle been in
charge, if one were to extend his logic, the entire process of
incorporating the First Amendment to cover the states would have been
dismissed for failing to meet a millennial-long time standard.
It was in Richmond Newspapers that a First Amendment right of
access first appeared, involving the closure of a trial of an adult by a
judge after a series of mistrials.93 Two years later in Globe Newspaper
Co. v. Superior Court, the Supreme Court underlined its commitment to
open trials, this time in a case involving a juvenile.94 Writing for a
divided Court in Richmond Newspapers, Chief Justice Burger called the
medias right to courtroom access coextensive with that of the public, an
analogy Flynt tried unsuccessfully to extend to the battlefield.95 The
87 Id.
88 Rumsfeld II, 355 F.3d 697, 704 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (internal quotations omitted)..
89 Id. at 704 (quoting and citing Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555,
569 (1980)).
90 Id.
91 Rumsfeld II, 355 F.3d at 704 (quoting Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 15
(1978) (Burger, C.J., plurality)); cf. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 849-50
(1974) (holding the media had no First Amendment right to access federal prisons); Pell
v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974) (Similarly, newsmen have no constitutional right
of access to [state] prisons or their inmates beyond that afforded the general public.)
92 Rumsfeld II, 355 F.3d at 704.
93 See generally Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (Burger,
C.J., plurality).
94 See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Sup. Ct. for Norfolk City, 457 U.S. 596, 607-11
(1982).
95 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575-77 (Burger, C.J., plurality).
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Court in Globe Newspaper established a three-part test: that there was a
tradition of openness, that it was a significant and traditional role in a
government activity, and that a compelling government interest existed
warranting narrowly fashioned limitations.96 Justice Brennan considered
the publics access to the courtroom plays a particularly significant role
in the functioning of both the judicial system and the government in
general, a standard battlefield access very likely could match.97 But was
there under this test historic openness to the battlefield for the press and
could narrowly defined government controls be instituted to satisfy both
media and military concerns? When they wish, Supreme Court Justices
or their law clerkscan ignore or discover what they wise in the broad
corpus of precedent.
H. Presidential War Powers
Perhaps any final argument or justification for barring press access to
the battlefield involves presidential war powers and judicial deference to
the military and government when it comes to war and national security.
The Department of Defense in Nation argued the presidents war powers
were involved in any claim of battlefield access.98 Judge Sand disagreed
in his decision, determining press pools did not affect the internal
functioning of the military, and therefore, did not implicate the
Presidents Commander-in-Chief powers.99 The government did not raise
the issue of presidential war powers in any of the Rumsfeld cases, though
it seems a likely argument should another case advance to the Supreme
Court. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes majority opinion in Schenck v.
United States intrudes on any arguments for constitutional press
battlefield access: When a nation is at war many things that might be
said in time[s] of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their
utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court
could regard them as protected by any constitutional right.100 The
Supreme Court in Korematsu upheld the constitutionality of the
96 See Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 607-11..
97 Id. at 606.
98 Id. at 1567 (In this case, there is no challenge to this countrys military
establishment, its goals, directives or tactics. As such, the Presidents Article II powers as
Commander-in-Chief are not implicated because resolution of the question does not
impact upon the internal functioning and operation of the military.).
99 Nation Magazine v. U.S. Dept of Def., 762 F. Supp. 1558, 1567 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(In this case, there is no challenge to this countrys military establishment, its goals,
directives or tactics. As such, the Presidents Article II powers as Commander-in-Chief
are not implicated because resolution of the question does not impact upon the internal
functioning and operation of the military.)
100 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
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internment of Japanese-Americans on national security grounds while the
country was still gripped by post-Pearl Harbor hysteria.101 In Near v.
Minnesota, Chief Justice Hughes acknowledged a governmental right to
prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of
the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops.102
Chief Justice Hughes emphasized this governmental power is not
unlimited and has been recognized only in exceptional cases.103 Is
media access to the battlefield exceptional? If so, will it remain the
standard?
Justice Douglas flatly declared, The war power stems from a
declaration of war . . . The Constitution by Art. I, s 8, gives Congress, not
the President, power (t)o declare War. Nowhere are presidential wars
authorized.104 Concurring in the same case, Justice Stewart believed that
given the enormous power of the executive branch in national defense
and international relations, a free press was essential.105
I. Other Arguments
In Houchins, the Court ruled there was no First Amendment right of
access to a county jail.106 The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
repeated its conclusion from J.B. Pictures, Inc. v. Dept. of Defense that
freedom of speech, [and] of the press do not create any per se right of
access to government . . . activities, simply because such access might
lead to more thorough or better reporting.107 Pointedly, the court in J.B.
Pictures mentioned both the speech and press clauses as separate. J.B.
Pictures involved access to Dover Air Force base to photograph arrival
ceremonies for the coffins of deceased service members in the wake of
the first Gulf War.108
Turning again to the prison access cases, the Supreme Court ruled
unambiguously in Pell, the First and Fourteenth Amendments bar
government from interfering in any way with a free press.109 Justice
Stewart, writing for the majority, blunted that sentiment, [t]he
101 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217-20 (1944).
102 Near v. Minn., 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
103 Id.
104 N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 722 (1971) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
105 Id. at 727-28 (Stewart, J., concurring).
106 See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1978) (Burger, C.J., plurality).
107 JB Pictures, Inc. v. Dept. of Def., 86 F.3d 236, 238 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
108 Id. (Official arrival ceremonies were to be held nearer family members homes, even
though the port of entry was at Dover. The Court of Appeals upheld the militarys plans
to close the base for this purpose and the Supreme Court denied certiorari on appeal.)
109 Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974).
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Constitution does not, however, require government to accord the press
special access to information not shared by members of the public
generally.110 Furthermore, the Court stressed a journalist certainly
[was] free to seek out sources of information not available to members
of the general public and had some constitutional protection for
confidentiality of those sources, and was free from prior restraints
against publication.111 That prescription looks very similar to Judge
Sentelles suggestion that reporters can have access to the battlefield if
they can find a way there themselves, as will be discussed later. The
Court drew a clear distinction between access to a newsworthy event and
the freedom to receive information, a situation that it looks upon
favorably.112 The Court has scrupulously put access to information in an
inferior position to its protection against prior restraint. Will it always do
so? In the wake of Edward Snowdens revelations of widespread
governmental intrusions on personal liberties, has the political and
publicand therefore judiciallandscape shifted?
IV. GLIMMERS OF NEWRIGHTS
An uncertain glimmer of hope was left by Judge Sentelle in his Court
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit decision in Rumsfeld, expanding a bit the
Supreme Courts decision in Saxbe and weakening somewhat his own
decision. The Government has no ruleat least so far as Flynt has made
known to usthat prohibits the media from generally covering war,
Judge Sentelle explained.113 He added, [a]lthough it would be
dangerous, a media outlet could presumably purchase a vehicle, equip it
with the necessary technical equipment, take it to a region in conflict,
and cover events there. Such action would not violate Enclosure 3 or any
other identified DoD rule.114 Is a new right of access peering out at
some Supreme Court Justice? That independent access, coupled with
embedding, would seem to represent precisely what journalists clamor
for: unrestricted access to the battlefield. However, there is no guarantee
that embedding will continue to be the Pentagons policy or that once an
independent reporter arrives at battlefield, he or she would be given any
110 Id.
111 Id. (emphasis added). A constitutional basis for a federal shield law might begin
with this decision. See generally id. 817.
112 Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-65 (1972). In Kleindienst, the Court
denied an avowed Belgian communists appeal against a visa denial to attend an
academic conference, while remarking approvingly of a general right to receive
information. See id.
113 Rumsfeld II, 355 F.3d 697, 702 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
114 Id.
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sort of accommodation or protection from the inevitable hazards of a
combat zone. Given the history of access over the past two decades,
these are not unreasonable worries. Only a Supreme Court decision will
remove this uncertainty.
The federal district court in Rumsfeld I was persuaded that in an
appropriate case there could be a substantial likelihood of demonstrating
that under the First Amendment the press is guaranteed a right to gather
and report news involving United States military operations on foreign
soil subject to reasonable [security concerns].115 There are the rubs:
What is reasonable and who decides? The Pentagon is allowed,
constitutionally, as emphasized by the court in Rumsfeld II, to impose
reasonable limitations when dealing with the media.116 Judge Sentelle
stated, [a]t no time has Flynt ever claimed that he, or Hustler, was
treated differently under the [Department of Defense] Directive . . . Nor
has he claimed that the Directive is some sort of sham that was not
followed.117 He added, Even if there were some underlying
constitutional right of media access to U.S. troops in battle, the Directive,
and its application to appellants in this case, certainly would not have
violated it.118 The court said the Pentagons responses to Flynts various
requests were handled expeditiously, and it found compelling the
governments position that there was inherent danger and unique
circumstances involved in Special Forces combat that permitted curbs on
media access.119 What about a normal combat environment?
A. New Rights
New rights have been discovered in the Constitution, and the
existence of these rights is guaranteed by the Ninth Amendment, which
states, The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.120
Historian Bernard Bailyn, in a speech at the White House in 1998,
observed that the Ninth Amendment is a universe of rights, possessed
by the people  latent rights, still to be evoked and enacted into law.121
He termed it a reservoir of other, unenumerated rights that the people
115 Rumsfeld I, 180 F. Supp. 2d 174, 175 (D.D.C. 2002)
116 Rumsfeld II, 355 F.3d at 705
117 Id.
118 Id. at 705-06.
119 Id.
120 U.S. CONST., amend. IX.
121 Bernard Bailyn, Remarks at a White House Millennium Meeting Evening, (Feb. 11,
1998), available at http://clinton4.nara.gov/Initiatives/Millennium/bbailyn.html.
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retain.122 This view builds on James Madisons speech introducing the
Bill of Rights in 1789 that there was a great residuum of rights of the
people existing outside the Constitution that were not limited,
circumscribed, or preempted by the Constitution.123
Just because a right is not historicand of course the definition of the
word historic can be elasticdoes not mean that the Supreme Court will
not discover evidence of it resident in the Constitution. Roe v. Wade,
basing abortion rights on a right to privacy, is the most obvious recent
example of a new right being discerned in the Constitution.124 It was also
by no means certain at one point that the Court would guarantee press
access to the courtroom.
B. Dissents and an Analog
Past dissents have eventually influenced the Court to alter previous
positions. Justice Brandeis dissent in Olmstead v. United States is a
prominent example.125 In Olmstead, the Court upheld the
constitutionality of wiretapping private telephone conversations. This
brought a stinging rebuke from Justice Brandeis, who noted the
Constitution conferred . . . the right to be let alonethe most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.126
Olmstead was specifically overturned by Katz v. United States nearly 40
years later in 1967.127 And ultimately the Olmstead dissent led to Roe.
There have been several dissents involving freedom of the press. In
his Pell v. Procunier dissent, Justice Douglas insisted, [t]he press has a
preferred position in our constitutional scheme . . . to bring fulfillment to
the publics right to know.128 How can you meet that high purpose if
journalists cannot go and look where they wish independently? Justice
Stewart in his dissent in Branzburg stated the corollary to a right to
publish must be the right to gather news and that newsgathering is no
122 Id.; See also DAN FARBER, RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE SILENT NINTH
AMENDMENT AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AMERICANS DONT KNOW THEY HAVE
(Basic Books, 2007).
123 James Madison, Speech introducing the Bill of Rights at the Second Congress (June
8, 1789).
124 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 114 (1973).
125 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
126 Id. Within seven years, Justice Brandeis dissent was being quoted in various
Supreme Court decisions. In all, his dissent was quoted in eleven Court decisions from
1945-1967, five dissents and six majority opinions.
127 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967). Brandeis had a long history
of supporting a right to privacy, writing along those lines in a law journal article 38 years
earlier: Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193 (1890).
128 Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 840 (1984).
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less important than news dissemination.129 Both could be building
blocks for a potentially successful First Amendment battlefield access
right.
Then there is the Second Amendment, perhaps the poster child for
hopes for a constitutional battlefield access decision by the Supreme
Court. Rights and the make-up of the Court are moveable feasts. For
decades, the country wrestled with the constitutional issue of individual
gun ownership. Was it constitutionally protected within the context of a
militia or was it an individual right? For seven decades the final word
rested on a Depression-era Supreme Court decisionUnited States v.
Millerproclaiming the Second Amendment applied only to a well-
regulated militia.130 Furthermore, in 1992, the Court shied away from
ruling on the Second Amendment by declining to grant certiorari in
United States v. Hale, a case it could have used to rule on the
constitutional limits of an individual or collective right to bear arms.131
Then, in 2008, with a different and more conservative composition,
the Supreme Court declared 5-4 in District of Columbia v. Heller that
gun ownership was an individual constitutional right.132 Whether a
similar set of circumstances is likely to produce constitutionally
guaranteed access to the battlefield by the media is, of course, impossible
to predict. However, it is at least plausible such a scenario could unfold
as the shifting alliances and changing membership of the Court and the
wider political climate presents new opportunities for such a decision.
V. CONCLUSION
What arguments realistically remain to be brought before the
Supreme Court, providing both the metaphorical and legal traction for
the Humvee and its reporter struggling across the sand at the start of this
study? Justice White claimed in Branzburg that without some protection
for seeking out the news, freedom of the press would be eviscerated.133
Justice Stewart in his dissent in the same case stated, Without freedom
to acquire information, the right to publish would be impermissibly
compromised.134 Accordingly, Justice Stewart continued, [A] right to
gather news, of some dimension, must exist.135 One place to gather that
information, unfiltered and immediate, is on the battlefield where
129 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 727-28 (1972).
130 See U.S. v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
131 See U.S. v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1992).
132 See District of Columbia et al v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
133 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681.
134 Id. at 728.
135 Id.
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American foreign policy is being played out with deadly consequences.
It is from there that citizens most need information from the media to
evaluate the propriety, purpose, and price of war.
There have been intriguing and suggestive intimations from various
courts that might open the door ever so slightly to shape a constitutional
access decision. In Nation, Judge Sand found a minimal right for the
media to view and report about overt combat operations and that a
conditional right of access existed.136 In Weinberger II, Judge Edwards
considered media battlefield access rights a potentially important issue
of constitutional law.137 In Rumsfeld I, the federal district court foresaw
an appropriate case in which there would be a substantial likelihood
of demonstrating a constitutional right to gather and report military
activities on foreign soil.138 Even Chief Justice Burger admitted
journalists had priority of entry to courtrooms.139
Justice Stewart in Branzburg considered that some protection was
essential for the process by which news is assembled to ensure the
proper functioning of the American constitutional system.140 In
Richmond Newspapers, Justice Stevens supported protection for the
media from abridgement of their rights of access to information about
the operation of their government.141 In Sheppard, Justice Stewart
praised the media as the Fourth Estate, performing an independent
checking function on government.142 Moreover, in Houchins, Justice
Stewart in his concurrence expanded this view, believing access
restrictions for the public were unreasonable as applied to
journalists . . . there to convey information to the public.143 Judge
Sentelle saw no bar to journalists finding their own way to a battlefield,
and perhaps without realizing it, suggested journalists had a right to be
there.144 Means of transportation seems a pretty thin rationale when
evaluating levels of constitutional rights and privilege. And in stirring
language, Justice Black, in his concurrence, stated support for a
rhetorical base for the paramount duty of journalists to report from the
battlefield to prevent the government from deceiving the people and
136 Nation Magazine v. U.S. Dept of Def., 762 F.Supp. 1558, 1572 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
137 Weinberger II, 762 F.2d 134, 136 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Edwards, J., concurring).
138 Rumsfeld I, 180 F. Supp. 2d 174, 175 (D.D.C. 2002).
139 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1980).
140 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 725 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
141 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 584 (Stevens, J., concurring).
142 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 349-50 (1966).
143 Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1, 17 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring).
144 Rumsfeld II, 355 F.3d 697, 702 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
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sending [soldiers] off to distant lands to die of foreign fevers and foreign
shot and shell.145
Despite comments to the contrary, the Supreme Court has
established press rights separate from the Speech Clause, most notably
prohibiting prior restraint, favoring free press over fair trial rights,
protecting the media against libel, supporting parody, and extending
press freedoms online.146 Jurists and historians have maintained that, like
Justice Stewart, the Framers would not have inserted a constitutional
superfluity into the First Amendment, suggesting that there is some sort
of independent meaning to the Press Clause. Without media rights
separate from the Speech Clause nested in the Press Clause, the Court is
unlikely ever to suggest, let alone decide, that private citizens have a
constitutional right to be present on the battlefield. If so, the question of
media access necessary to acquire information is an essential and
unavoidable consideration the Supreme Court needs to confront. That the
media play structural watchdog and surrogate roles in the American
democracy are important arguments that have already found support
from the Supreme Court. Independent access to where news happens is
essential if the media are to convey independentand independently
obtainedinformation to the general citizenry to formulate educated
decisions.
What actually remains in wake of the high courts denial of certiorari
in Flynt v. Rumsfeld?147 Only suggestions and hints and hopes. Some
promising but ephemeral language about the value of actual in the field
newsgathering to underpin the purpose of the First Amendment. And yet,
a Supreme Court decision is not in the best interests of the media,
government, and military. A political solution should preempt a judicial
one, and a compromise is preferable to a high court ruling. Why?
Because both sides risk an unacceptable and unpalatable resolution to
this constitutional conundrum. There can be few professions that more
readily misunderstand each other, British Major S. F. Crozier observed,
than journalists and soldiers.148 Both professions must learn to respect
the other and acknowledge or at least tolerate the others role in the
145 N.Y. Times, Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J., concurring).
146 See, e.g., New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Nebraska
Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964); Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496 (1991); Hustler Magazine,
Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988); and Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521
U.S. 844 (1997).
147 Rumsfeld III, 543 U.S. 925 (2004).
148 ALAN HOOPER, THE MILITARY AND THE MEDIA (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1993), 3 (quoting S.F. Crozier, THE PRESS AND THE ARMY, Army Quarterly, July
1954, at 214).
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American constitutional framework. Both should seek a rapprochement
to find a middle ground that guarantees some sort of expeditious and
uncensored media access to the battlefield so Americans can be provided
with the necessary information to make informed decisions about their
countrys future, while ensuring their continuing safety and security. And
it would allow the journalist at the opening of this study to report with
confidence wherever her instincts, battle, and a story take her.
Good! Now we shall have news from Hell before breakfast.
 General William Tecumseh Sherman, after being told,
erroneously, that three reporters had been killed in an artillery
barrage, c. 1863149
149 Carl Sessions, Artful Snippets on a Somewhat Noble Profession, AMERICAN
JOURNALISM REVIEW (Mar. 2000) (reviewing CRUSADERS, SCOUNDRELS, JOURNALISTS:
THE NEWSEUMS MOST INTRIGUING NEWSPEOPLE (Eric Newton ed., Crown 2000),
available at http://www.ajr.org/Article.asp?id=3114).
